

ILLEGIB

Approved For Release 2009/06/03 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000800100051-1

DOE review completed.

JCS review completed.

**Page Denied**

Approved For Release 2009/06/03 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000800100051-1

2066  
P

25X1

REFERRED TO		RECEIVED		RELEASED		SEEN BY	
OFFICE	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	NAME & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE
DIRECTOR	[Redacted]						
DOCUMENT NO. <u>50</u> NO CHANGE IN CLASS <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S <u>(C)</u> NEXT REVIEW DATE: <u>2-2-11</u> AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE <u>3-13-81</u> REVIEWER: [Redacted]						JOB NO. <u>8001731-R</u> BOX NO. <u>9</u> FOLDER NO. <u>20</u> TOTAL DOCS HEREIN <u>1</u>	

FORM NO. 38.13 PREVIOUS EDITIONS NOT TO BE USED  
 FEB 1948

Atomic Energy

~~TOP SECRET~~

Pages 10 8  
Series A

O S I

C E N T R A L   I N T E L L I G E N C E   A G E N C Y

N U C L E A R   E N E R G Y   B R A N C H

STATUS OF THE U.S.S.R. ATOMIC ENERGY PROJECT  
An Extended Estimate for the  
Joint Staff Plans Group of the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1 October 1949

OSI/SR-15/49/1

WARNING: For Limited distribution only.

DOCUMENT NO: 49  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS ☐  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 2011 25X1  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2011  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE 3/13/81 REVIEWER:

This report has been agreed upon by the members of the Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee which is composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

STATUS OF THE U.S.S.R. ATOMIC ENERGY PROJECT

The Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee makes the following estimate of future U.S.S.R. bomb capabilities in the light of recent events.

1. The explosion, somewhere in Siberia on or about 28 August 1949, of a Soviet atomic bomb (presumably their first) made of plutonium confirms our previous conclusion that the Soviet atomic energy project was directed toward the production of plutonium bombs.

2. The fixing of this date has made possible the reevaluation of much fragmentary information which previously we could not interpret. This reevaluation, together with some new information, leads to the following conclusion:

The U.S.S.R. has had one and possibly two graphite-moderated production piles in operation since about October 1948. It is suspected that there is a third production pile under construction which may be in operation shortly. There is no evidence or indication that the Soviets are developing a uranium isotope separation process at the present time.

3. Based on this conclusion, on current estimates of the maximum amount of uranium available, on the assumption that the first bomb assembled was tested immediately, and on the assumption that their plants will operate at high efficiency, it is estimated that the maximum number of bombs in the Soviet stockpile will be roughly:

10	by the end of 1949
25	by mid-1950
50	by mid-1951
75	by mid-1952
110	by mid-1953

(For long range planning purposes after mid-1953, the bomb production rate may be assumed to be 40 per year; Nagasaki-type bombs have been assumed for purpose of calculation.) In making these estimates based on a plutonium bomb, it is assumed that the Soviets will put into effect by mid-1950 the more important improved procedures in pile operation recently instituted in the U. S.

4. The ultimate bomb stockpile depends not only on the supply of uranium ore, but also on the efficiency of the methods producing the fissionable materials. It is believed that the uranium ore supply is not a limiting factor now. The successful application of production methods which we can now envision will provide a more efficient utilization of their limited (relative to the U. S.) stockpile of uranium and will increase the ultimate stockpile by a substantial factor. Additional production facilities will be needed to increase the production rate significantly.

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~ No. 2 of Series A.

C S I

C E N T R A L   I N T E L L I G E N C E   A G E N C Y

N U C L E A R   E N E R G Y   B R A N C H

S T A T U S   O F   T H E   U . S . S . R .   A T O M I C   E N E R G Y   P R O J E C T

1 October 1949

OSI/SR-15/49

WARNING: This document may not be reproduced without prior approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.

DOCUMENT NO. 48  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS ☐  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S @ 25X1  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2011  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE 31/3/81 REVIEWER:

This report has been agreed upon by the members of the Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee which is composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

STATUS OF THE U.S.S.R. ATOMIC ENERGY PROJECT

The Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee makes the following estimate of future U.S.S.R. bomb capabilities in the light of recent events.

1. The explosion, somewhere in Siberia on or about 28 August 1949, of a Soviet atomic bomb (presumably their first) made of plutonium confirms our previous conclusion that the Soviet atomic energy project was directed toward the production of plutonium bombs.

2. The fixing of this date has made possible the reevaluation of much fragmentary information which previously we could not interpret. Based on this reevaluation and some new information, on current estimates of the maximum amount of uranium available, on the assumption that the first bomb assembled was tested immediately, and on the assumption that their plants will operate at high efficiency, it is estimated that the maximum number of bombs in the Soviet stockpile will be roughly:

10 by the end of 1949  
50 by mid-1951  
110 by mid-1953

In making these estimates based on a plutonium bomb, it is assumed that the Soviets will put into effect by mid-1950 the more important improved procedures in pile operation recently instituted in the U. S.

TOP SECRET

VOTING SLIP

AGENCY: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Report OSI/SR-15/49/1, dated 1 October 1949

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Approved with the following exceptions: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

SIGNED: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_